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Abstract—This paper aims at investigating the problem of
fast convergence to the Nash equilibrium (NE) for N-Player
noncooperative differential games. The proposed method is such
that the players attain their NE point without steady-state
oscillation (SSO) by measuring only their payoff values with
no information about payoff functions, the model and also the
actions of other players are not required for the players. The
proposed method is based on an extremum seeking (ES) method,
and moreover, compared to the traditional ES approaches, in the
presented algorithm, the players can accomplish their NE faster.
In fact, in our method the amplitude of the sinusoidal excitation
signal in classical ES is adaptively updated and exponentially
converges to zero. In addition, the analysis of convergence to NE
is provided in this paper. Finally, a simulation example confirms
the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Index Terms—Extremum seeking, Non-cooperative differential
games, Learning, Nash equilibria.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE problem of finding an algorithm to attain NE hasinspired many researchers thanks to the vast variety of
applications of differential non-cooperative games in areas
such as motion planning [1], [2], [3], formation control [4],
[5], wireless networks [6], [7], mobile sensor networks [8],
[9], network security [10] and demand side management in
smart grid [11], [12].
The majority of algorithms which are designed to achieve
convergence to NE are based on the model information and
observation of other player’s actions. These algorithms usually
are designed on the basis of best response and fictitious play
strategy. In [13], each agent plays a best response strategy
in a non-myopic Cournot competition. A form of dynamic
fictitious and gradient play strategy in a continuous time form
of repeated matrix games have been introduced in [14] and
the convergence to NE has been shown. Distributed iterative
algorithms have been considered in [15] to compute the
equilibria in general class of non-quadratic convex games.
The authors in [16] have presented two distributed learning
algorithms in which players remember their own payoff values
and actions from the last play; also the convergence to the set
of Nash equilibria was proved. An algorithm based on the
combination of the support enumeration method and the local
search method for finding NE has been designed in [17].
Furthermore, many works are uncoupled which means each
player generates its actions based on its own payoff not the
actions or payoffs of the opponents. A new type of learning
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rule which is called regret testing in a finite game was
introduced in [18] in which behaviors of players converge to
the set of Nash equilibria. In [19], almost certain convergence
to NE in a finite game with uncoupled strategy, and possibility
and impossibility results are studied.
Moreover, some of the non-model based algorithms are a
kind of extremum seeking control algorithm (ESC) which is
a real time optimization tool that can find an extremum value
of an unknown mapping [20], [21], [22]. For example, in
[23], the Nash seeking problem for N-player non-cooperative
games with static quadratic and dynamic payoff functions
is presented, which is based on the sinusoidal perturbation
extremum seeking approach. The same analysis for dynamic
systems with non-quadratic payoffs has been considered in
[24], [25]. The problem of attaining NE in non-cooperative
games based on the stochastic extremum seeking is studied in
[26]. However, the convergence to NE in all of the non-model
based extremum seeking methods mentioned have steady-state
oscillation.
In this paper, we have modified an extremum seeking
control without steady-state oscillation (ESCWSSO) algorithm
[27] to design a seeking scheme to solve this problem for
an N-player differential non-cooperative game, which is faster
than conventional extremum seeking algorithms in achieving
NE. In this algorithm, the players can generate their actions
only by measuring their own payoff value with no need for
information regarding the model, details of the payoff function,
and actions of other players. More importantly, the NE can be
achieved fast and without steady-state oscillation, because the
amplitude of excitation sinusoidal signal in classical extremum
seeking is adjusted to exponentially converge to zero. As a
result, the convergence will be fast and the improper effects
of steady-state oscillation will be eliminated. The similar
analyses have been provided in [28] and [29] for static non-
cooperative games with quadratic and non-quadratic payoff
functions. However, since they have investigated static games,
dynamic systems are excluded from their analysis. Addition-
ally, authors in [30] have proposed a new algorithm for fast
and without steady state oscillation convergence to NE with a
local dynamic within the algorithm for static non-cooperative
games. Also, they have shown two case studies in formation
control of mobile sensor networks.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows
• Comparing to the previous works for achieving NE, this
paper can achieve the NE fast and without steady state
oscillation.
• In this paper we modified the previous algorithm [27] in
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2order to be applicable on differential games which are
multi-agent systems and proved the convergence of NE
in such games.
• In comparison to the previous works in [29], and [30]
which all were on static games, this paper studied differ-
ential and dynamic games which can make this algorithm
applicable for a vast variety of new applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion II, the Nash seeking algorithm and the general
description of the problem are stated. section III includes
convergence and stability analysis. A numerical example with
simulation is presented in section IV. Finally, a conclusion is
provided in section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we consider the problem of fast convergence
to NE without steady state oscillation in non-cooperative
differential games with N players in which players can con-
verge to their NE fast and without oscillation only with the
measurement of their own payoff values, which means that
they do not need to have any knowledge of the model and
actions of other players.
Consider the following nonlinear model of player i in an
N-player non-cooperative differential game:
x˙ = f(x, u) (1)
Ji = ji(x) (2)
where i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, u ∈ RN is actions of players which is
u = [u1, . . . , uN ], x is the state and Ji, ji and f are smooth
functions where ji : Rn → R, f : Rn × RN → Rn and
Ji ∈ R. At first, let’s make the following assumptions about
the game, which are the same as [24].
Assumption 1. There exists a smooth function l : RN → Rn
such that f(x, u) = 0 if and only if x = l(u).
Assumption 2. The equilibrium of system (1) which is x =
l(u) is locally exponentially stable for all u ∈ RN .
Thus, these assumptions mean that any actions of the players
can be designed to stabilize the equilibrium without any
knowledge about the model, other players’ actions or form
of ji, f and l.
Each player i employs the following algorithm in order to
generate its actions to achieve NE.
˙ˆui = ki(Ji − ni) sin(ωit+ φi),
ui = uˆi + ai sin(ωit+ φi),
a˙i = −ωliai + biωli(Ji − ni),
n˙i = −ωhini + ωhiJi,
(3)
where ki and ωi are positive constants, ωi = ω¯ω˜i in which ω¯
is a positive rational number and ω˜i is a positive real number,
Ji is the measurement value of payoff, ni is the low-frequency
components of Ji, bi and φi are constants where bi can adjust
the speed of convergence, ωli and ωhi are cut-off frequencies
for low pass and high pass filters respectively. Also, ωli and
bi are new parameters which can be used instead of excitation
Fig. 1. NE seeking without steady-state oscillation scheme for an N-player
non-cooperative differential game
sinusoidal signal’s amplitude in classical extremum seeking
control, which are designed to make ai positive. Figure 1
shows the diagram of the algorithm in an N-player non-
cooperative differential game.
We introduce the following errors for more analysis:
u˜i = uˆi − u∗i ,
n˜i = ni − ji ◦ l(u∗).
(4)
where u∗ is a vector of players’ NE u∗ = [u∗1, . . . , u
∗
N ].
By substituting (4) into (3), the following equation is
obtained:
x˙ = f(x, u˜+ u∗ + a× η(t))
˙˜ui = ki(ji(x)− ji ◦ l(u∗)− n˜i) sin(ωit+ φi),
a˙i = −ωliai(t) + biωli(ji(x)− ji ◦ l(u∗)− n˜i),
˙˜ni = −ωhin˜i(t) + ωhi(ji(x)− ji ◦ l(u∗)),
(5)
where ηi(t) = sin(ωit + φi), u˜ = [u˜1, . . . , u˜N ], a =
[a1(t), . . . , aN (t)], and η(t) = [η1(t), . . . , ηN (t)]. In addition,
in the equation a×η(t), (×) sign means the entry-wise product
of two vectors.
For more analysis, the design parameters are chosen as
follows:
ωli = ωωLi = ωω
′
Li = O(ωδ),
ωhi = ωωHi = ωδω
′
Hi = O(ωδ),
ki = ωKi = ωδK
′
i = O(ωδ),
(6)
where  and δ are small constant parameters, and ω′Hi, K
′
i
and ω′Li are O(1) positive constants. Afterwards, the system
in time scale τ = ω¯t is obtained.
ω¯
dx
dτ
= f(x, u˜+ u∗ + a× η(τ)) (7)
3d
dτ
 u˜i(τ)ai(τ)
n˜i(τ)
 = δ
 K ′i(ji(x)− ji ◦ l(u∗)− n˜i)ηi(τ)ω′Li(bi(ji(x)− ji ◦ l(u∗)− n˜i)− ai)
ω′Hi(ji(x)− ji ◦ l(u∗)− n˜i)

(8)
Furthermore, the following assumptions are made to ensure
the existence of NE u∗:
Assumption 3. The game admits at least one stable NE u∗
in which
∂ji ◦ l
∂ui
(u∗) = 0,
∂2ji ◦ l
∂u2i
(u∗) < 0. (9)
Assumption 4. The following matrix is diagonally dominant
and consequently nonsingular. Hence, according to Assump-
tion 3 and Gershgorin Circle theorem [31], it is also Hurwitz.
∆ =

∂2j1ol(u
∗)
∂u21
∂2j1ol(u
∗)
∂u1∂u2
. . . ∂
2j1ol(u
∗)
∂u1∂uN
∂2j2ol(u
∗)
∂u1∂u2
∂2j2ol(u
∗)
∂u22
∂2j2ol(u
∗)
∂u2∂uN
...
. . .
...
∂2jNol(u
∗)
∂u1∂uN
∂2jNol(u
∗)
∂u2N
 (10)
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, local stability and convergence analysis of
proposed algorithm will be studied.
A. Averaging analysis
For averaging analysis, let’s freeze x in quasi-steady state
equilibrium:
x = l(u˜+ u∗ + a× η(τ)) (11)
By substituting (11) to (8), the reduced system is given as
follows:
d
dτ
 u˜ri(τ)ari(τ)
n˜ri(τ)
 =
δ
[
K′i(ji ◦ l(u˜r + u∗ + ar × η)− ji ◦ l(u∗)− n˜ri)ηi(τ)
ω′Li(bi(ji ◦ l(u˜r + u∗ + ar × η)− ji ◦ l(u∗)− n˜ri)− ari)
ω′Hi(ji ◦ l(u˜r + u∗ + ar × η)− ji ◦ l(u∗)− n˜ri)
]
(12)
in which if we consider ji ◦ l(u˜r +u∗+ar× η)− ji ◦ l(u∗) =
hi ◦ l(u˜avr + aavr × η), regarding to Assumption 3, we have
hi ◦ l(0) = 0, ∂hi ◦ l
∂ui
(0) = 0,
∂2hi ◦ l
∂u2i
(0) < 0. (13)
Since (12) is in the proper form of averaging theory [32], the
averaging system is obtained as follows:
˙˜uavri (τ) = δ( lim
T→+∞
K ′i
T
∫ T
0
(hi ◦ l(u˜avr + aavr × η)ηi(τ) dτ),
a˙avri (τ) = δω
′
Li(bi( lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
hi ◦ l(u˜avr + aavr × η) dτ
− n˜avri )− aavri ),
˙˜navri (τ) = δω
′
Hi( lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
hi ◦ l(u˜avr + aavr × η) dτ−
n˜avri ).
(14)
Therefore, the following result can be derived.
Theorem 1. Consider system (12) for an N-player game, re-
garding to Assumptions 3 and 4 where ωi 6= ωj , ωi 6= ωj+ωk,
2ωi 6= ωj + ωk, ωi 6= 2ωj + ωk, ωi 6= 2ωj , ωi 6= 3ωj
and ωiωj is rational, for all i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then, with
constants σ, , δ > 0 which 0 <  <  and 0 < δ < δ, there
exists a neighborhood for equilibrium point of average system
(u˜er, 0, n˜
e
r) that (u˜r, ar, n˜r) will exponentially converge to that
neighborhood.
Proof. According to this fact that ddτ = 0 and by using
the center manifold technique [33], we rewrite (14) in the
following form:
z˙ =
d
dτ
 u˜avri (τ)aavri (τ)

 = A1z + g1(z, y) (15)
y˙ =
dn˜avri (τ)
dτ
= A2z + g2(z, y) (16)
where A1 =
 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
,g1(z, y) = δ
 g11g12
0
, g11 =
limT→+∞
K′i
T
∫ T
0
(hi ◦ l(u˜avr + aavr × η))ηi dτ) and g12 =
ω′Li(−aavri +bi(−y+limT→+∞ 1T
∫ T
0
hi◦l(u˜avr +aavr ×η) dτ)),
g2(z, y) = limT→+∞
δω′Hi
T
∫ T
0
hi ◦ l(u˜avr + aavr × η) dτ) and
A2 = −δω′Hi.
Firstly, consider the following lemmas about center mani-
fold.
Lemma 1. There exists a center manifold y = q(z), ‖z‖ < 0
for (15) and (16), in which q ∈ C2 and σ > 0, if we have the
following conditions:
1) A1 and A2 are constant matrices where all the eigen-
values of A1 and A2 have zero real part and negative
real parts respectively.
2) g1 and g2 are C2 so that gi(0, 0) = 0, ∂gi∂z (0, 0) = 0
and ∂gi∂y (0, 0) = 0, ∀ i = {1, 2}. [33]
Lemma 2. Consider a Ψ(z) ∈ C1 where Ψ(0) = 0 and
∂Ψ
∂z (0) = 0, such that M(Ψ(z)) = O(‖z‖m) where m > 1,
then if ‖x‖ → 0 we have |q(z)− ψ(z)| = O(‖z‖m) [33].
Lemma 3. The stability situation of the origin of (15) and
(16) is the same as the origin of the following equation. [33]
z˙ = A1z + g1(z, q(z)) (17)
which means that if the origin of (17) is either stable, expo-
nentially stable, or unstable then it would be the same for the
origin of (15) and (16).
Therefore, according to Lemma 1, a center manifold y =
q(z) can be approximated, because the assumptions of Lemma
1 are held in (15) and (16). Thus, we have the following
equation:
M(Ψ(z)) =
∂Ψ
∂u˜avri
∂u˜avri
∂τ
+
∂Ψ
∂aavri
∂aavri
∂τ
+
∂Ψ
∂
∂
∂τ
+ δω′Hi(Ψ(z)− lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
hi ◦ l(u˜avr + aavr × η) dτ).
(18)
4By considering Assumption 4, if Ψ(z) = ∂
2hi◦l(0)
2∂u2i
u˜av
2
ri +
∂2hi◦l(0)
4∂u2ri
aav
2
ri , then M(Ψ(z)) is O(|u˜avri |3 +|aavri |3 +||3). As a
result, by Lemma 2, the center manifold is obtained as follows:
y = q(z) = Ψ(z) =
∂2hi ◦ l(0)
2∂u2ri
u˜av
2
ri +
∂2hi ◦ l(0)
4∂u2ri
aav
2
ri
+O(|u˜avri |3 + |aavri |3 + ||3).
(19)
By substituting center manifold y into (14), the following
equations are given:
˙˜uavri (τ) = δ( lim
T→+∞
K ′i
T
∫ T
0
(hi ◦ l(u˜avr + aavr × η))ηi(τ) dτ)
(20)
a˙avri (τ) = −δω′Liaavri +biδω′LiO(|u˜avri |3+|aavri |3+||3). (21)
According to Lemma 3, we can use (20) and (21) in order to
analyze the stability of (14).
The equilibrium of (20) which is u˜er = [u˜
e
r1, . . . , u˜
e
rN ] admits
the following equation:
0 = lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
hi ◦ l(u˜avr + aavr × η)ηi(τ) dτ. (22)
We assume that the equilibrium point u˜eri for all i ∈
{1, . . . , N} is as follows:
u˜eri =
N∑
j=1
cija
av
rj +
N∑
j=1
N∑
k≥j
dijka
av
rj a
av
rk +O(max
i
aav
3
ri ). (23)
In regard to (13), if the Taylor polynomial approximation
[23], [34] of hi ◦ l about zero is substituted in (22) (the
details of Taylor polynomial approximation and the integrals
which are used are given in the Appendix), then the following
equation is acquired by applying the averaging technique:
0 =
aavri
2
 N∑
j 6=i
u˜erj
∂2hi ◦ l
∂uri∂urj
(0) + u˜eri
∂2hi ◦ l
∂u2ri
(0)
+
u˜e
2
ri
2
∂3hi ◦ l
∂u3ri
(0) +
N∑
j 6=i
(
u˜e
2
rj
2
+
aav
2
rj
4
)
∂3hi ◦ l
∂uri∂u2rj
(0)
+ u˜eri
N∑
j 6=i
u˜erj
∂3hi ◦ l
∂u2ri∂urj
(0) +
aav
2
ri
8
∂3hi ◦ l
∂u3ri
(0)
+
N∑
j 6=i
N∑
k>j,k 6=i
u˜erj u˜
e
rk
∂3hi ◦ l
∂uri∂urj∂urk
(0)
+O(max
i
aav
4
ri ).
(24)
Furthermore, (23) is substituted in (24) to compute cij and d
i
jk.
By matching first order powers of aavri , we have 0...
0
 = N∑
i=1
aavri ∆
 c
1
i
...
cNi
 . (25)
Forasmuch as ∆ is nonsingular, so cij should be equal to zero
for all i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Therefore, with matching second
order powers of aavri , the following equations are computed 0...
0
 = N∑
j=1
N∑
k>j
aavrj a
av
rk∆
 d
1
jk
...
dNjk
 . (26)
 0...
0
 = N∑
j=1
aav
2
rj

∆
 d
1
jj
...
dNjj
+

1
4
∂3h1ol
∂ur1∂u2rj
(0)
...
1
4
∂3hj−1ol
∂urj−1∂u2rj
(0)
1
8
∂3hjol
∂u3rj
(0)
1
4
∂3hj+1ol
∂u2rj∂urj+1
(0)
...
1
4
∂3hNol
∂u2rj∂urN
(0)


.
(27)
As a result, dijk = 0 for ∀i 6= j and dijj is
 d
1
jj
...
dNjj
 = −∆−1

1
4
∂3h1ol
∂ur1∂u2rj
(0)
...
1
4
∂3hj−1ol
∂urj−1∂u2rj
(0)
1
8
∂3hjol
∂u3rj
(0)
1
4
∂3hj+1ol
∂u2rj∂urj+1
(0)
...
1
4
∂3hNol
∂u2rj∂urN
(0)

. (28)
Consequently, the equilibrium becomes
u˜eri =
N∑
j=1
dijja
av2
rj +O(max
i
aav
3
ri ). (29)
Since the Jacobian Γav = (γij)(N×N) of averaging system
(20) is as follows:
γij = δK
′
i lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
∂hi ◦ l
∂urj
(u˜avr +a
av
r ×η)ηi(τ) dτ (30)
by Taylor polynomial approximation and substituting average
system equilibrium u˜er we have
γij =
1
2
δK ′ia
av
ri
∂2hi ◦ l
∂uri∂urj
(0) +O(δmax
i
aav
2
ri ) (31)
According to Assumptions 3 and 4, and the fact that aavri is
small and positive, (31) is Hurwitz. Thus, the equilibrium (29)
is exponentially stable for average system (20). Additionally, if
u˜avri in (21) is frozen at the equilibrium (29) [20], since δω
′
Li >
0 and following the perturbation theory [32], for all 0 <  < ¯
where ¯ > 0, (21) is exponentially stable at the origin. Also,
since n˜eri is center manifold, and is equal to
∂2hi◦l(0)
2∂u2i
u˜e
2
ri +
∂2hi◦l(0)
4∂u2i
aav
2
ri +O(|u˜eri|3 + |aavri |3 + ||3), and as aavri and u˜eri
converge to zero, it will converge to a small neighborhood of
zero.
5Finally, corresponding to the averaging theory and Lemma 3,
for 0 < δ < δ and σ > 0 where δ > 0, the equilibrium
of reduced system (12) is exponentially stable, which means
(u˜ri, ari, n˜ri) exponentially converges to a neighborhood of
(u˜eri, 0, n˜
e
ri), and the proof is completed.
B. Singular perturbation analysis
We propound the following result in order to investigate the
complete system (7) and (8) with singular perturbation theory
[32] in the time scale τ = ω¯t.
Theorem 2. Consider system (7) and (8) under the Assump-
tions 1, 2, 3, 4 and suppose ωi 6= ωj , ωi 6= ωj + ωk,
2ωi 6= ωj + ωk, ωi 6= 2ωj + ωk, ωi 6= 2ωj , ωi 6= 3ωj
and ωiωj is rational, for all i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, there exists a
neighborhood of (x, uˆi, ai, ni) = (l(u∗), u∗i , 0, hi ◦ l(u∗)) for
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} along with constants 0 <  < , 0 < ω¯ < ω∗,
0 < δ < δ and σ > 0 where , ω∗, δ > 0. Then, the solution
(x, uˆi, ai, ni) will converge exponentially to that point, and
J(t) will converge to hi ◦ l(u∗) exponentially.
Proof. Corresponding to Theorem 1 and [34], there exists a
unique exponentially stable periodic solution W pri =
 u˜priapri
n˜pri

for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} in a neighborhood of average solution u˜aviaavi
n˜avi
, which if we substitute in the system (8) in the form
of dWidτ = δHi(τ,W, x), we will have
dW pri
dτ
= δHi(L(τ,W
p
r ),W
p
ri) (32)
where L(τ,W ) = l(u∗ + u˜ + a× η(τ)). Then, with defining
W˜i = Wi −Wri(τ), we have
ω¯
dx
dτ
= F¯ (τ, W˜ , x) (33)
dW˜i
dτ
= δH¯i(τ, W˜ , x) (34)
where W˜ = [W˜1, . . . , W˜N ] and
H¯i(τ, W˜ , x) = Hi(τ, W˜i +W
p
ri(τ), x)
−Hi(τ, L(τ,W pr ),W pri(τ))
(35)
F¯ (τ, W˜ , x) = f
x, β(x, u∗ + u˜− u˜pr︸ ︷︷ ︸
W˜1
+u˜pr + a× η(τ))
 .
(36)
Since x = L(W˜ +W pr ) is the quasi-steady state, the reduced
system is as follows:
dW˜ri
dτ
= δH¯i(τ, W˜ri +W
p
ri, L(W˜r +W
p
r )) (37)
in which W˜r = 0 is the equilibrium at the origin, which is
exponentially stable as it has been shown in section 3.1
Now, the boundary layer model is studied in the time scale
t = τω¯ :
dxb
dt
= F¯ (xb + L(W˜r +W
p
r ), W˜ )
= f(xb + l(u), β(xb + l(u), u))
(38)
where u = u∗ + u˜ + a × η(τ) is regarded as an independent
parameter from t. Hence, since f(l(u), β(l(u)), u) ≡ 0 and
the equilibrium of (38) is xb = 0, according to Assumption 2,
this equilibrium is exponentially stable.
With exponential stability of the origin in the reduced model
and boundary layer model, also with the use of Tikhonov’s
theorem [32], for 0 < ω¯ < ω∗ where ω∗ > 0, we can
conclude that the solution W (τ) is close to Wr(τ) with
a small neighborhood, so it exponentially converges to the
periodic solution W pr (τ) with a small neighborhood, where
W pr (τ) is within a neighborhood of equilibrium of the average
system. As a result, (x, uˆi, ai, ni) exponentially converges to
(l(u∗), u∗i , 0, hi ◦ l(u∗)), and consequently Ji will exponen-
tially converge to its extremum value which is hi ◦ l(u∗), and
the proof is completed.
Remark 1. The reason of having fast convergence to NE is
that when we have large initial input estimation error, the
amplitude of the excitation signal will be large (see eq. (21))
and consequently the Jacobian matrix Γav will be large since
it is proportional to the amplitude. Also, since the amplitude
will shrink gradually, the oscillation will be eliminated. This
is why there is no steady state oscillation.
Remark 2. All proofs were based on the maximization of the
payoff. In order to make the problem for minimization we just
need to assume ki < 0, and the Jacobian matrix should be
kept Hurwitz, because (9) is changed to ∂
2ji◦l
∂u2i
(u∗) > 0.
Remark 3. According to [35], the systems like what we have
in (14) has a manifold equilibrium where if the system starts at
any point on the equilibrium manifold, the system stays there
and will not converge to zero. Thus, u˜i may not converge to
zero and instead converges to a constant, if the system reaches
to the manifold equilibrium. However, for small  or in other
words for large initial amplitude ai(0) the exponential stability
will be guaranteed. This can happen for large initial value of
input estimation error. We can have this condition by choosing
proper design parameter in our ES controller. As a result,
the exponential stability in this paper is guaranteed, unless
the design parameters were chosen to have small initial input
estimation error.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE AND SIMULATIONS
In this section, we consider a differential non-cooperative
game so that the advantages of the proposed algorithm are
investigated precisely. Oligopoly games with nonlinear de-
mand and payoff functions [36] are motivations of these kinds
of games. Consider the following differential non-cooperative
game [23]:
x˙1 = −4x1 + x1x2 + u1
x˙2 = −4x2 + u2
(39)
6J1 = −16x21 + 8x21x2 − x21x22 − 6x1x22 +
773
32
x1x2 − 5
8
x1
J2 = −64x32 + 48x1x2 − 12x1x22
(40)
The equilibrium states are calculated as
xe1 =
4u1
16− u2 , x
e
2 =
1
4
u2. (41)
Therefore, we have the following Jacobian:[ −4 + 14u2 4u116−u2
0 −4
]
(42)
This matrix is Hurwitz for u2 < 16, thus the action set of
players get restricted to {(u1, u2) ∈ R2|u1, u2 ≥ 0, u2 < 16}.
Hence, xe = (xe1, x
e
2) is exponentially stable for all (u1, u2)
in the defined action set. Then, at x = xe, the payoffs are
given as follows:
J1 = −u21 +
3
2
u1u2 − 5
32
u1 (43)
J2 = −u32 + 3u1u2 (44)
Therefore, the system has two Nash equilibria (u∗11, u
∗
21) =
( 2664 ,
5
8 ) and (u
∗
12, u
∗
22) = (
1
64 ,
1
8 ). (u
∗
11, u
∗
21) admits Assump-
tions 3 and 4, so it is stable, while (u∗12, u
∗
22) cannot satisfy
the assumptions, hence we conduct the algorithm to achieve
(u∗11, u
∗
21). The design parameters are selected as: k1 = 1.273,
k2 = 0.9046, b1 = 0.7, b2 = 0.5, ωl1 = 0.9, ωl2 = 1.5,
ωh1 = 0.12, ωh2 = 0.2, ω1 = 2, ω2 = 3 and φ1 = φ2 = 0.
The initial value of (uˆ1, uˆ2) is (uˆ1(0), uˆ2(0)) = (0.25, 0.9),
also the state (x1, x2) is initiated at the origin. Figure 2
illustrates the history of action values for each player. Figure 3
depicts the payoff values of each player as a function of
time. Also, Figure 4 shows a comparison between the pro-
posed algorithm in this paper with the conventional extremum
seeking control algorithms. Obviously this figure confirms the
effectiveness and superiority of this algorithm with the ability
of eliminating steady state oscillation and fast convergence
to NE in comparison with the traditional extremum seeking
control algorithms.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a fast extremum seeking approach was
introduced for N-Player noncooperative differential games.
It was shown that, to attain the Nash equilibrium (NE),
each player generates its action and it was not required
detailed information about payoff functions, the model and
also other players’ actions. Moreover, NE was achieved
without oscillation and faster compared to the classical
extremum seeking-based approaches. As a result, the
inappropriate influence of steady-state oscillation was
eliminated. Moreover, the stability and convergence analysis
were presented in which the convergence without steady-state
oscillation to NE was proved. Furthermore, the effectiveness
of the proposed method was shown through a numerical
example. Also, the comparison results of simulations between
the proposed method and the conventional extremum seeking
methods illustrated the superiority of the proposed algorithm.
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Fig. 2. Action values of players as a function of time by implementing the
proposed method in this paper
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in this paper
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APPENDIX A
INTEGRALS COMPUTATION
Many integrals along with Taylor polynomial approximation
of hi ◦ l need to be computed in order to obtain (24), so for
i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N} we have
lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
ηi(τ) dτ = 0, lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
η2i (τ) dτ =
1
2
,
lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
η3i (τ) dτ = 0, lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
η4i (τ) dτ =
3
8
,
(45)
and by making these assumptions that ωi 6= ωj , 2ωi 6= ωj ,
and 3ωi 6= ωj :
lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
ηi(τ)ηj(τ) dτ = 0,
lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
η2i (τ)ηj(τ) dτ = 0,
lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
η3i (τ)ηj(τ) dτ = 0,
lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
η2i (τ)η
2
j (τ) dτ =
1
4
,
(46)
and these assumption that ωi 6= ωj + ωk, ωi 6= 2ωj + ωk, and
2ωi 6= ωj + ωk:
lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
ηi(τ)ηj(τ)ηk(τ) dτ = 0,
lim
T→+∞
1
T
∫ T
0
ηi(τ)η
2
j (τ)ηk(τ) dτ = 0.
(47)
APPENDIX B
TAYLOR POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION
The Taylor polynomial approximation [34] of hi ◦ l requires
n+1 times differentiability of hi ◦ l, so the following equation
is obtained:
hi ◦ l(u˜e + aav × η) =
n∑
α1+...+αN=0
∂(α1+...+αN )
∂uα11 . . . ∂u
αN
N
hi ◦ l(0)
α1. . . αN
(u˜e + aav × η)α
+
∑
α1+...+αN=n+1
∂(α1+...+αN )
∂uα11 . . . ∂u
αN
N
hi ◦ l(ι)
α1. . . αN
(u˜e + aav × η)α
=
n∑
α1+...+αN=0
hi ◦ l(0)
α1. . . αN
(u˜e + aav × η)α
+O(max
i
aav
n+1
i )
(48)
where ι is a point on the line segment of interval [0 u˜e +
aav × η(τ)], α = (α1, . . . , αN ) and uα means uα11 . . . uαNN .
Additionally, O(maxi aav
n+1
i ) is computed on the basis of
substituting (23). In the process of computing (24), we select
n = 3 to derive the third order derivation effect on the system
as in [23].
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